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INTRODUCTION
In 1807 the British Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone embarked on an
unprecedented experiment in international humanitarian intervention under
the auspices of its Chief Judge, Robert Thorpe. From the court's seat at
Freetown, Thorpe authored and implemented a judicial policy that hastened
the demise of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and challenged the principles of free
navigation that remain the subject of fierce legal controversy to this day.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the British colony of Sierra
Leone served as a naval base from which the Royal Navy aggressively
intercepted and captured foreign vessels involved in the trans-Atlantic slave
trade. Thorpe's court adjudicated cases involving those captive ships and
released their human cargo into the colony. The court ordered the release of so
many captive Africans in Sierra Leone that, by 1850, approximately 40,000
freed slaves lived in the precincts of Freetown alone.'
This Note offers a historical narrative of this early and bold judicial
experiment in humanitarian intervention. First, the Note will explain the role
that British courts played as the enforcers of a nascent international legal norm
prohibiting the slave trade. Second, in recounting Chief Judge Robert Thorpe's
tenure on the court, it will offer a case study of judicial actors at the vanguard
of social and legal change.' Third, it will present, for the first time, a full
account of the direct historical context of the celebrated Le Louis case, which
affirmed the principle that no state may board, search, or otherwise exercise
jurisdiction over the ships of another state in peacetime.' Finally, it will discuss
how the work of Thorpe's court relates to current challenges to the traditional
law-of-the-sea regime governing freedom of navigation, paying particular
attention to the challenges posed by the Proliferation Security Initiative.
1. P.E.H. Hair, The Enslavement of Koelle's Informants, 6 J. AFR. HIST. 193, 193 (1965).
2. Robert Cover's seminal work, Justice Accused, presents a similar study on the role of
American judges in the abolition of slavery. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:
ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975). In many ways, Cover's study of American
judges caught between the formal demands of the law and the moral demands of conscience
serves as an intellectual touchstone of this Note. However, because the sources that survive
from the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone are quite limited, I cannot provide a
psychological portrait of Robert Thorpe as complete as that which Cover was able to
provide of Lemuel Shaw.
3- (1817) 16S Eng. Rep. 1464 (High Ct. of Adm.). The case is frequently included or cited in
international law textbooks as upholding the principle of noninterference in navigation on
the high seas. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLUE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24o n.62
(5th ed. 1998); W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 650-52 (2d ed. 2004).
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The research presented in this Note fills an important gap in the existing
literature on the abolition of the slave trade. In his masterful study of the Royal
Navy's role as the strong arm of Britain's abolitionist ambitions, Christopher
Lloyd wrote that "[t]he Slave Trade was... suppressed by the twin weapons
of diplomatic pressure and the exercise of naval power."'4 The role of these twin
powers can hardly be overstated. Yet absent from Lloyd's study-and the
historiography of Sierra Leone altogether-is an account of the role that the
Court of Vice Admiralty played as the third pillar supporting the suppression
of the slave trade. The court, which sat from 1807 until it was replaced by the
Courts of Mixed Commission in 1817, mediated between the twin powers of
diplomacy and naval might. Of the three premier historians of Sierra Leone,'
only Christopher Fyfe has discussed the work of the Court of Vice Admiralty,
and his treatment of the subject is quite cursory.6
A possible reason for this gap in the historiography is that the British
admiralty courts followed civil rather than common law procedure. Because the
study of the admiralty courts requires knowledge of this distinctive body of
law, historians of English law and British history have frequently overlooked
the records of admiralty courts, thus neglecting the central role these courts
played in adjudicating international disputes.7 Moreover, case law reporting by
the High Court of Admiralty in London was not formalized until 1798,8 while
4. CHRISTOPHER LLOYD, THE NAvY AND THE SLAVE TRADE: THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN
SLAvE TRADE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, at x (1949). Although dated in its ideological
undertones, Lloyd's book is indispensable to understanding the position of the British Navy
as the strong arm of British abolitionism.
S. Christopher Fyfe, John Peterson, and A.B.C. Sibthorpe have written the definitive histories
of Sierra Leone. See CHRISTOPHER FYFE, A HISTORY OF SIERRA LEONE (1962); JOHN
PETERSON, PROVINCE OF FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF SIERRA LEONE 1787-1870 (1969); A.B.C.
SIBTHORPE, THE HISTORY OF SIERRA LEONE (4 th ed. 1970).
6. FYFE, supra note 5, at 107, 1O9, 115-16.
7. The history of the British courts of admiralty reads rather like a biography with missing
chapters. Certain periods in the history of the courts are well documented; for example, the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. See RICHARD HILL, THE PRIZES OF WAR: THE
NAVAL PRIZE SYSTEM IN THE NAPOLEONIC WARS, 1793-1815 (1998) (discussing the role of the
British Admiralty in waging war against Napoleon, but not its role in the abolition of the
slave trade); RICHARD PARES, COLONIAL BLOCKADE AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS: 1739-1763 (photo.
reprint 1975) (1938); E.S. ROSCOE, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE ADMIRALTY AND PRIZE
COURTS (1932). Other periods, including the one with which this Note is concerned, remain
unaccounted for by historians.
8. ROSCOE, supra note 7, at 35-36. Some earlier records from the admiralty courts do survive,
and have been published for general reference. See HALE AND FLEETWOOD ON ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION (M.J. Prichard & D.E.C. Yale eds., 1993); 1 SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF
ADMIRALTY (Reginald G. Marsden ed., London, Selden Society 1894).
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reporting by the courts of vice admiralty was never formalized at all.
Consequently, what records do survive from the vice admiralty courts are
relatively few, dispersed, and incomplete. Scholars of the history of Sierra
Leone appear to have overlooked the archival sources that constitute the core of
this account: the correspondence and court records of the Court of Vice
Admiralty at Sierra Leone. 9
The British courts of vice admiralty were, by merit of their prize
jurisdiction, uniquely situated to deal with politically sensitive legal questions.
Prize cases- cases stemming from disputes over the wartime rights of neutrals
and belligerents to engage in trade and transport by sea-were invariably shot
through with political, diplomatic, and military considerations. These cases
required a judge to be legally ambidextrous- to be as proficient in the laws of
his home state as he was in treaty law and the law of nations, all the while
bearing in mind the impact of his decisions on military and diplomatic affairs.
Courts with prize jurisdiction sat at the intersection of wartime diplomacy and
international law, and their judges (particularly Thorpe) were acutely aware of
this fact. Consequently, British admiralty courts proved especially fruitful
ground for the development of international public policy.
Part I of this Note will show how humanitarian and geopolitical
imperatives forced the interests of private philanthropists and public officials to
converge squarely on Freetown in 1807. In the process, this Part will explain
how the American and French Revolutions led to Britain's abolition of the
slave trade and the establishment of a colony at Sierra Leone. Part II will focus
on the manner in which Chief Judge Robert Thorpe carved out a commanding
legal regime from his humble Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone,
attempting to make Great Britain the enforcer of a near-universal ban on the
West African slave trade. Part II will also track the development of Thorpe's
early experiment in humanitarian intervention through its almost eight-year
duration (18o8-1815). Part III will then illustrate how diplomatic pressure led
to the ultimate demise of Thorpe's tenure as Chief Judge of the Court of Vice
Admiralty at Sierra Leone -but not until after the pressure Thorpe exercised
from the bench had helped set in motion the demise of the slave trade itself.
Part IV will demonstrate how the reevaluation of the freedom of the seas
regime that Thorpe helped precipitate has a modern parallel in the current
9. The Public Record Office (PRO) in London holds the correspondence between Chief Judge
Thorpe and members of the British government, along with copies of ships' logs and case
records. The files in London do not include all of the work undertaken by the Court of Vice
Admiralty at Sierra Leone, but they are sufficiently comprehensive to provide insights into
its workings.
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Proliferation Security Initiative, which seeks to constrain the seaborne trade in
weapons of mass destruction.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In order to understand the legal context in which Robert Thorpe presided
over the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone, it is important to understand
the historical context in which the colony itself was established. The origins of
the Sierra Leone colony were bound up with the aspirations of British
abolitionists -private individuals who strove to effect humanitarian change on
an international scale. The first British settlement at Sierra Leone in 1782 was
the culmination of what one historian has called "the great period of
abolitionist euphoria."1° The creation of a free territory on the slave coast of
Africa, in which not only the trade in slaves but also the institution of slavery
itself was forbidden, buoyed abolitionist hopes that a general ban on the slave
trade in Britain would soon follow. Two sets of political pressures militated
toward the fulfillment of this goal. The first was the problem of London's black
poor, whose numbers had swelled with the arrival of black loyalists from North
America in the wake of the American Revolution. The second was the shadow
of Napoleon Bonaparte.
A. The Population Imperative
The first blacks who settled in the Sierra Leone colony were largely former
slaves who had fought for the British (and had thus been freed) during the
io. F.E. Sanderson, The Liverpool Abolitionists, in LIVERPOOL, THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE, AND
ABOLITION: ESSAYS To ILLUSTRATE CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND RESEARCH 196, 196 (Roger
Anstey & P.E.H. Hair eds., 1976) [hereinafter ESSAYS To ILLUSTRATE CURRENT
KNOWLEDGE].
11. Opposition to such a ban came largely from Bristol and Liverpool, port cities that had
prospered from the "horrid trade." Yet public opinion, often intensified by evangelical zeal,
overpowered the influence of the slave traders. When statistics on slave mortality rates and
the brutal methods employed in the slave trade were presented to Parliament in 1792, public
outcry reached new heights; and when slave traders protested that abolition vitiated the
spirit of free-market capitalism, abolitionists replied that capitalism could never condone the
treatment of human beings as chattel. For additional discussion of capitalism and ideology
in the abolitionist movement, see Seymour Drescher, Capitalism and Abolition: Values and
Forces in Britain, 1783-1814, in ESSAYS To ILLUSTRATE CURRENT KNOWLEDGE, supra note to,
at 167. See also THE ANTISLAVERY DEBATE: CAPITALISM AND ABOLITIONISM AS A PROBLEM IN
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (Thomas Bender ed., 1992).
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American Revolution.1 2 After the British defeat, hundreds of freed slaves who
had served in the vanquished army found themselves in poverty in London.
Thousands more made their way to Nova Scotia, following Britain's promises
of free land-promises that would ultimately prove empty. 3 This new
population, referred to as the "black poor," attracted the attention of an
influential alliance between evangelical Christians, who saw the black poor as
victims of a trade the evangelicals sought to abolish, and prominent London
merchants and bankers, who sought to reward black loyalists for their service
to Britain. These two groups banded together to form the Committee for the
Black Poor in 1786.' 4 Yet, as Stephen Braidwood has noted, the Committee
"realised at a very early stage that the provision of immediate relief, however
welcome, was no long-term answer to the problem of deep poverty among
London's black population.""5 Resetdement in Africa was the Committee's
solution. 16
12. STEPHEN J. BRAIDWOOD, BLACK POOP, AND WHITE PHILANTHROPISTS: LONDON'S BLACKS AND
THE FOUNDATION OF THE SIERRA LEONE SETTLEMENT 1786-1791, at 24 (1994). See generally
MARY LOUISE CLIFFORD, FROM SLAVERY TO FREETOWN: BLACK LOYALISTS AFTER THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1999) (detailing the difficult circumstances in which black loyalists
found themselves after the American Revolution and their attempts to resettle in Canada,
England, and Sierra Leone). While the war raged, Britons and colonials alike competed for
the loyalty and service of the captive North American slave population. Historian Edgar J.
McManus has noted that "[t]he bargaining power of [American] slaves grew tremendously
during the war, and masters found themselves under heavy pressure to make concessions in
order to obtain loyal service." EDGAR J. McMANus, BLACK BONDAGE IN THE NORTH 153
(1973). McManus also pointed out that some slaves found themselves able to negotiate the
terms of their own sale, even to the extent that they were able to require that prospective
buyers promise them manumission after a certain term of labor. Id. at 153-54.
13. Christopher Fyfe, Introduction to 'OUR CHILDREN FREE AND HAPPY': LETTERS FROM BLACK
SETTLERS IN AFRICA IN THE 179OS, at 1 (Christopher Fyfe ed., 1991). For additional
information on Britain's promises of free land, see FYFE, supra note 5, at 31-35.
14. BRAIDWOOD, supra note 12, at 64-67.
is. Id. at 70.
16. See id. at 83. This proposal was first presented to the Committee when the dubious character
of Henry "The Flycatcher" Smeathman, a botanist, entomologist, and traveler who was
known to dabble in bigamy and hot air balloons, stepped onto the scene. Smeathman
nurtured ambitions of establishing an African settlement under his own control. See Deirdre
Coleman, Henry Smeathman, the Fly-Catching Abolitionist, in DISCOURSES OF SLAVERY AND
ABOLITION: BRITAIN AND ITS COLONIES, 176o-1838, at 141 (Brycchan Carey et al. eds., 2004).
Back in London, he presented these plans to the Committee for the Black Poor. See FYFE,
supra note 5, at 14-15. Suspicious as Smeathman's proposal was, it became all the more
suspect when it was revealed not only that creditors were pursuing him, but that he was
amenable to enslaving his prospective pioneers. BRAIDWOOD, supra note 12, at 83-94.
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The evangelical abolitionist Granville Sharp stepped forward, determined
to effect this resettlement. Long a champion of the abolitionist cause, 7 Sharp
envisioned a "Province of Freedom" in Africa for freed slaves and poor blacks.
He won the support of the Clapham Sect, a group of prominent abolitionists
that included Member of Parliament William Wilberforce 8 and the future
Governor of Sierra Leone Zachary Macaulay.19 The Committee also recruited
Olaudah Equiano, an ardent abolitionist and former slave who had purchased
his own liberty and who would later serve as commissary for the voyage to
Africa.2° With the financial backing of private donors and the support of the
British Navy, Sharp and the Committee organized the first settlement
expedition to Sierra Leone. In May 1787, 411 settlers arrived at the River Sierra
Leone at the beginning of the malaria- and fever-ridden rainy season. They
purchased approximately twenty square miles of land from a local Temne chief
and named their settlement Granville Town."
17. See E.C.P. LASCELLES, GRANViLLE SHARP AND THE FREEDOM OF SLAVES IN ENGLAND 63-80
(1928) (providing an account of the philosophical and religious forces that helped to mold
Sharp's commitment to the abolitionist cause).
i8. One of the crowning achievements of Wilberforce's political career was his success in
enacting an 1833 law abolishing slavery in all parts of the British Empire except for India and
St. Helena. See JOHN POLLOCK, WILBERFORCE 306-08 (1977); see also Act for the Abolition of
the Slave Trade, 1807, 47 Geo. 3, c. 36 (U.K.).
19. PETERSON, supra note 5, at 21-22.
20. Equiano ultimately resigned from his position, unable to turn a blind eye to the
embezzlement committed by the leader of the voyage, Joseph Irwin, a friend of Henry
Smeathman. Olaudah Equiano, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or
Gustavus Vassa, the African (1814), reprinted in THE CLASSIC SLAVE NARRATIVES 172-73 (Henry
Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1987). Equiano discussed the episode in his autobiography, writing:
Thus ended my part of the long-talked-of expedition to Sierra Leona; an
expedition, which, however unfortunate in the event, was humane and politic in
its design; nor was its failure owing to government; every thing was done on their
part; but there was evidently sufficient mismanagement, attending the conduct
and execution of it, to defeat its success.
Id. at 174.
21. BRAIDWOOD, supra note 12, at 181-85. The Temne did not consider this "purchase" a sale of
property in the Western sense (i.e., involving an alienation of property rights in perpetuity).
On the contrary, such arrangements were considered a form of tenancy in which the tribal
landlord retained certain rights over the territory, including the ability to help himself to
gifts from it and the right to mediate disputes among its inhabitants. The settlers at Sierra
Leone rejected all such claims to tribal lordship over the area. See V.R. Dorjahn &
Christopher Fyfe, Landlord and Stranger: Change in Tenancy Relations in Sierra Leone, 3 J.
AFR. HIST. 391, 395-96 (1962).
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B. The Geopolitical Imperative
The young settlement at Sierra Leone attracted the attention of the British
government with the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars. The English
evangelicals who were preoccupied with the problem of London's black poor
also saw a message from God emblazoned on the map of Europe in the form of
Napoleon Bonaparte. They viewed the revolution in France and the ascendancy
of Napoleon as divine punishment for Western Europe's sinful participation in
the slave trade.22 Whether or not Napoleon's forces represented the vengeful
hand of God at work, two things quickly became clear to the British
government. First, if Britain was to retain a foothold in West Africa, she
needed to turn Sierra Leone into a crown colony. Second, the slave-trading
ships based in Bristol and Liverpool would be far better utilized in the defense
of British interests against Napoleon than in the traffic of human cargo.
By 1807, the privately sponsored humanitarian experiment at Sierra Leone
was foundering. Attempts to establish local agriculture were failing, as were
attempts to establish regular trade contacts with the colony's hinterlands.23
Moreover, French raids laid waste to parts of the setdement, and the French
fleet repeatedly destroyed supplies en route to the colony from England.'
Facing the risk of losing a strategic naval base at Sierra Leone, along with the
loss of the abolitionist cause in Africa altogether, the British government
declared Sierra Leone a crown colony in August 1807. The Board of Directors
of the Sierra Leone Company regrouped, forming an association called the
African Institution. The Institution purported merely to offer helpful advice to
2. Abolitionist James Stephen wrote that the slave-trading powers had
dragged away every year 74,000 of [Africa's] unhappy children; and a great part
of her coast began to be almost destitute of inhabitants.... But the eye of the
Almighty was over them; and to avenge devoted Africa at least, if not to save her,
he dropped down among them the French [R] evolution.
JAMES STEPHEN, NEW REASONS FOR ABOLISHING THE SLAVE TRADE 61-62 (London, J.
Butterworth & J. Hatchard 1807).
23. The inland trade from Freetown failed in large part because the Sierra Leone colonists
refused to trade in slaves with local peoples, particularly the Fula. A striking exception to
African participation in the slave trade during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries were the Baga, who lived in the Rio Pongus and Rio Nufiez area. Winston
McGowan, African Resistance to the Atlantic Slave Trade in West Africa, 11 SLAVERY &
ABOLITION 5, 5-29 (1990) [hereinafter McGowan, African Resistance]. For a discussion of the
establishment of inland trade, see Winston McGowan, The Establishment of Long-Distance
Trade Between Sierra Leone and Its Hinterland, 1787-1821, 31 J. AFR. HIST. 25, 25-32 (1990).
24. A dizzying account of one such raid can be found in SUBSTANCE OF THE REPORT OF THE
COURT OF DIRECTORS OF THE SIERRA LEONE COMPANY, DELIVERED TO THE GENERAL COURT
OF PROPRIETORS ON THURSDAY THE 26TH OF FEBRUARY, 1795 (Phila., Dobson 1795).
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a British government too preoccupied with war to pay much attention to the
fledgling colony.2" In reality, the Institution came very close to governing
Sierra Leone, just as it had done in the days of the Sierra Leone Company.
Indeed, as Zachary Macaulay wrote to then Colonial Governor Robert Ludlam
in 1807, "I have no doubt the [Westminster] government will be disposed to
adopt almost any plan which we may propose to them with respect to Africa,
provided we will but save them the trouble of thinking.2 6
Westminster did have more pressing concerns. In order to confront
Napoleon's fleet, it would have to muster all naval resources available. Banning
British subjects from participating in the slave trade would free up many of the
ships of Bristol and Liverpool, cities that had prospered from that trade. Thus
was abolitionist zeal coupled with brute necessity to secure the passage of the
1807 Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade . 7 The Act forbade all British
subjects throughout the United Kingdom and her colonies from buying,
selling, transporting, or otherwise transferring ownership of slaves. Slaves
could neither be transported into the Empire from Africa, nor traded among
British subjects within the Empire. Furthermore, the Act prohibited British
subjects from so much as outfitting a ship for the transport or trade of slaves,
rendering all the trappings of such a voyage, from ship to shackles, confiscable
by the government.
In May of 1807, a Court of Vice Admiralty was established at Sierra Leone.
It was here that the travails of Robert Thorpe, Chief Judge of the Sierra Leone
Colony, began.
II. CHIEF JUDGE THORPE AND THE COURT OF VICE ADMIRALTY
On May 2, 1807, the British Foreign Secretary issued letters patent
establishing a Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone. The letters patent
conferred upon the court a prize jurisdiction
to be limited to the prosecution and That only of captured [slaves]
seized or taken on or near the Coast of Africa together with the Ships
25. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE AFRICAN INSTITUTION, READ TO THE GENERAL MEETING
ON THE 15TH JULY, 1807, at 50 (London, Phillips 1807) (pledging that "we mean not to
colonize in Africa, or to trade there on our own account, but only to assist and give a right
direction to the enterprize of others, and to excite the industry of the natives of that
continent").
26. ROBERT THORPE, A LEFTER TO WILLIAM WILBERFORCE, ESQ. M.P., VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
AFRICAN INSTITUTION 32 (London, F.C. &J. Rivington 1815).
27. Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807, 47 Geo. 3, c. 36, arts. I-III (U.K.).
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Vessels or Boats in which they shall be so seized and taken and all the
Goods Wares Merchandize and Effects found on board the same.
2s
It would fall to the Chief Judge of the court to test the limits of the court's
jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. With the West Africa Squadron-the British
naval force charged with the defense of the West African coast 29 - hauling in
slave ships for condemnation as prize irrespective of nationality, the task of
presiding over the court was an unenviable one.
This Part will demonstrate how, by drawing on international law,
contemporary British case law, and his own conception of natural law, Chief
Judge Thorpe managed to cobble together a body of legal principles with
which to enforce a near-universal prohibition of the slave trade. The
geographic area over which he claimed jurisdiction extended far beyond the
precincts of Freetown and the hulls of British-flagged ships. From the Court of
Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone, Thorpe would adjudicate disputes over
Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch ships, placing a judicial imprimatur on the
naval campaigns of the West Africa Squadron. Thorpe would thus attempt to
crush the slave trade both by force and by force of law.
A. Thorpe's Jurisdictional Dilemma
According to the letters patent establishing the Court of Vice Admiralty at
Sierra Leone, "the Chief Civil Judge of the said Settlement of Sierra Leone
[was] to be the Judge of such Court."30 Robert Thorpe, a British barrister
28. Letters Patent Establishing a Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone (May 2, 1807) (on file
with PRO, Admiralty 5/51). I have supplied the term "slaves" in brackets, although the word
in the manuscript source is illegible. The term seems accurate because, according to Sir
William Scott, the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone "was intended merely to carry
into effect the provisions of the Slave Regulation Acts." Letter from William Scott, Judge of
the High Court of Admiralty, to the Earl of Bathurst, Sec'y of State for War & Colonies
(Aug. 5, 1812) (on file with PRO, Colonial Office 267/35).
29. Service in the West Africa Squadron was often thankless work. Naval historian Leslie
Gardiner has described it as
a task force of out-of-date sloops and frigates, far from the limelight, from Their
Lordships' notice and from the modest comforts of Channel or Mediterranean
warships. This was the station to which the bad hats, the unfortunates and those
without Interest were banished, to work out their penance and sacrifice their
healths and tempers and drop far behind in the betting when the promotion lists
were made up.
LESLIE GARDINER, THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY 218 (1968).
30. Letters Patent Establishing a Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone, supra note 28.
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based in Nova Scotia and a devoted abolitionist, assumed that position in
18o8. 31' He took over the post from Alexander Smith, former storekeeper to the
Sierra Leone Company and interim acting judge.32
A review of Thorpe's correspondence at the time of his appointment reveals
how difficult his new position was. "I was placed at the head of the Vice
Admiralty Court without my knowledge and without Salary," he wrote to Lord
Liverpool, then Secretary of State for War and Colonies. "[I]t was a new kind
of Investigation, [as] I had read Civil Law merely as a Gentleman at College
and had a little practice in the Ecclesiastical Court but none in the
Admiralty .... "33 Further complicating these unique circumstances, Thorpe
had little by way of institutional precedent on which to rely. He found the
court in shambles: too corrupt, too disorganized, and too poorly staffed to
enforce the abolition of the slave trade. Thorpe described the state of affairs
upon his arrival in the colony as follows: "I found a Tradesman had nominally
presided in this Court, he condemned, he purchased the Cargo and then
retailed it, the precedents were erroneous, the officers insufficient and
dissatisfied, and the practice indecorous, as there was no Salary every thing was
slovenly...."34
Moreover, Thorpe, apparently unlike his predecessor, was troubled by
Westminster's vague instructions and repeatedly sought official approval for an
expansive power to condemn slave ships. His requests for the clarification of
his authority met with little cooperation. For example, in an 1812 letter to Lord
Liverpool, an exasperated Thorpe asked for a clear mandate to condemn slave
ships. He explained that he found the court's prize commission "inadequate to
meet the various Cases that arose.""5 What was the judge to do, for example, if
a British ship captured a trading vessel outfitted with chains and shackles and
all the trappings of the slave trade, but with no slaves on board? Were only the
ships that were actually carrying slaves at the time of capture lawful prize?
31. The records of the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone state that Thorpe served as agent
for the Crown in both an 18o9 case involving the condemnation of a cargo of 167 slaves, and
a separate 18o9 case involving the illegal sale of an African woman by the name of Fee Seng
Be, alias Betsey. Thorpe acted as both judge and prosecutor in these cases, a dual function
characteristic of the civil law system employed in the courts of admiralty. See infra text
accompanying note 43; see also Records of the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone (on
file with PRO, High Court of Admiralty 49/97).
32. FYFE, supra note 5, at 115-16.
33. Letter from Robert Thorpe, Chief Judge, Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone, to Lord
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Thorpe urged Lord Liverpool to allow him to exercise the most expansive
jurisdiction possible, not only to free captive slaves, but also to ensure that the
humanitarian efforts of the West Africa Squadron were vindicated in court - in
effect, to ensure that these exercises of naval might bear a judicial
imprimatur.3
6
Notwithstanding the unclear mandate of his court's prize commission,
Thorpe remained committed to using the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra
Leone to enforce the ban on the slave trade. He saw his court both as a judicial
counterpart to the Royal Navy and as a powerful deterrent to would-be slave
traders. So committed was he to this project that he assumed an informal
prosecutorial role in the capture of ships in addition to his formal adjudicative
finction. As Thorpe explained in one letter to London:
The Governor has had Information of some of His Majesty['s] subjects
at Goree and in the Rio Pongus dealing in Slaves [of] late, if we can
bring them within reach of the Law, it will have an excellent effect, they
are rich and highly considered. I caused to be arrested one of the
greatest American Slave Traders, he carried off many of His Majesty's
subjects which he now holds in Slavery, on his Plantation in America,
we have much Testimony to collect, and if we make a complete example
of this fellow, it will alarm the American Factors widely and put many
to flight, it is wonderful what artful contrivances those wretches have to
escape the Law and Our Ships of War ...."
Thorpe's eagerness to prosecute American slave traders is particularly
striking. Although these traders were acting in contravention of an 1807 act of
the U.S. Congress banning the slave trade, 8 they were captured beyond what
would, at least in the abstract, be considered the territorial waters of Sierra
Leone. At that time, Goree was Portuguese-controlled, and the Rio Pongo was
populated largely by Portuguese and Spanish slave factors39 who operated
36. Id. For an example of the West Africa Squadron's activities, see infra notes 94-95.
37. Id.
38. Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (prohibiting the importation of slaves into any part or
place within the jurisdiction of the United States after January 1, 18o8).
39. "Factors" were slave traders who set up grim posts known as factories on the inland coasts
of Sierra Leone's rivers. "Factories took many forms," wrote historian Bruce L. Mouser,
but usually consisted of living quarters above or adjoining the store, a warehouse,
a barracoon to contain marketable slaves, a courtyard large enough to protect
visiting caravans and their merchandise, and usually a wharf where visitors
anchored their ships. Only the most wealthy could afford to fortify their factories
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independently of their respective governments. Britain made no claim to
sovereignty over these areas, but her Navy did not shy away from capturing
slave ships thought to have kidnapped black settlers from Sierra Leone for the
purposes of the slave trade.40
This is precisely what happened in the Bixby case described by Governor
William Maxwell in a letter to Lord Liverpool on May 8, 1812. The Royal Navy
captured an American citizen by the name of Joseph Bixby (alternately called
Biseby in the letter) on the Rio Pongo; he was subsequently convicted in Sierra
Leone of kidnapping two boys from the colony and selling them into slavery.
41
Maxwell had him imprisoned and, pending Westminster's decision, committed
to the custody of Lieutenant Mitchener of the H.M.S. Protector.42 Cases of this
kind appear to have arisen with some frequency in Thorpe's first four years in
Sierra Leone. He noted in exasperation in 1812 that "the Americans swarm on
the Coast, their Factors and Agents are evidently spread, and with Spanish or
Portuguese Flags, papers and citizenships they still carry on the Slave Trade
extensively.41
Engaging in an illegal slave trade under false colors posed a particularly
vexing problem to Thorpe, for Portugal retained some rights -the precise
extent of which were unclear- to the African slave trade under its 18lo treaty
with Britain. Under this treaty, Britain agreed that Portuguese slave ships
originating from that state's African dominions would be exempt from capture
by British ships. 44 However, the actual boundaries of colonial territories were
with cannon purchased from visitors' ships. Others salvaged cannon from
shipwrecks, which occurred frequently along the coast.
Bruce L. Mouser, Trade, Coasters, and Conflict in the Rio Pongo from 179o to 18o8, 14 J. AFR.
HIST. 45, 48 (1973).
40. In his 1815 Letter to Wilberforce, Thorpe wrote that the areas "were [n]ever considered as
belonging to Great Britain, nor did British jurisdiction ever extend over them in any shape."
THORPE, supra note 26, at 18. It could therefore be that the hope Thorpe expressed in 1812 of
bringing the slave traders operating there "within reach of the Law" was really a desire to
arrest them while they were visiting Sierra Leone. See supra text accompanying note 37.
However, the fact that the court so consistently convicted traders captured outside Sierra
Leone suggests that Thorpe's inconsistency on the matter was the product of a change in his
opinions over time.
41. Letter from William Maxwell, Governor of Sierra Leone Colony, to Lord Liverpool, Sec'y of
State for War & Colonies (May 8, 1812) (on file with PRO, Colonial Office 267/34). Sadly,
the case was not officially reported, and the records do not reveal whether the boys were
ever recovered and returned to their home.
42. Id.
43. Letter from Robert Thorpe to Lord Liverpool, supra note 33.
44. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 181o stipulated that the Prince Regent of Portugal would
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still somewhat amorphous. Further complicating matters, enterprising Spanish
and Portuguese merchants were establishing slave posts in areas not yet
officially recognized by Britain as Spanish or Portuguese territory. These
traders operated with the blessing of local African rulers, enjoying a landlord-
stranger relationship with their hosts45 and often marrying into the families of
local elites. 46 Consequently, it was sometimes difficult to determine whether
slaves originated in what could properly be called Spanish or Portuguese
dominions, notwithstanding the nationality of their captors. 47
Also of concern to Thorpe were Dutch and Danish traders who, like the
Spanish and Portuguese, traded for slaves even though, as he wrote,
they have no right to that trade because they have no Dominions to
supply [slaves] from, but they send small Craft to the Rivers in the
bight of Bissao and bring in small vessels what they want, deposit them
in those Islands and when they have collected a sufficient cargo ship
them off.
48
Moreover, continued Thorpe, "I fear the Dutch, Danes or Nations will soon get
Can[n]on, and the old trade [in slaves] will be reestablished." 49 Thus, the
Dutch and Danish problem was twofold. First, how could Thorpe enforce the
ban on the slave trade against Dutch and Danish ships? Whereas a bilateral
treaty had delimited, however loosely, the lawful boundaries of the Portuguese
trade in slaves, no such treaties existed between Britain and the Spanish,
Dutch, or Danes. With respect to American and Danish ships, Britain could
always claim to be helping to enforce national bans on the international slave
adop[t] the most efficacious means for bringing about a gradual abolition of the
Slave Trade throughout the whole of his Dominions. And actuated by this
principle, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal engages that his
Subjects shall not be permitted to carry on the Slave Trade on any part of the
Coast of Africa, not actually belonging to His Royal Highness's Dominions ....
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance Between His Britannic Majesty and His Royal Highness
the Prince Regent of Portugal, Port.-U.K., Feb. 19, 181o, 1 B.S.P. 547, 555-56. Thorpe
discussed the limits of this treaty in his letter to Lord Liverpool of February 6, 1812. See
Letter from Robert Thorpe to Lord Liverpool, supra note 33.
4S. See infra text accompanying note 73.
46. McGowan, African Resistance, supra note 23, at 7.
47. See Kenneth C. Wylie, The Slave Trade in Nineteenth Century Temneland and the British
Sphere of Influence, 16 AR. STUD. REV. 203, 206-08 (1973).
48. Letter from Robert Thorpe, Chief Judge, Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone, to the
Earl of Bathurst, Sec'y of War & Colonies (Nov. 20, 1812) (on file with PRO, Colonial Office
267/35).
49. Id.
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trade;"° no such ban existed in the Netherlands until 1814.5' Second, how could
Britain prevent the Dutch and Danes from securing a foothold in West Africa?
The Secretary of State for War and Colonies entertained ambitious proposals
for the containment of the Dutch and Danish traders but ultimately
Westminster took no direct action on the matter.52
Although Westminster was determined that the British Navy should give
vigorous effect to the abolition of the slave trade, it did not give clear guidance
to the courts of vice admiralty on how to deal with the legal fallout of this
policy. When Thorpe requested that his judicial superiors in England advise
him on how to approach cases in which Spanish- and Portuguese-flagged ships
had been captured while carrying on an illicit American slave trade, Sir William
Scott, Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, offered the following stultifying
reply:
[I]t would be particularly Improper for me to furnish the Instructions
required, as being the person to whom the Appeal immediately lies, and
whose duty it will be to examine these Cases when they come regularly
before me with all the Evidence that properly belonged to them, the
only Instruction which I should presume to give is that [you] must
obey Acts of Parliament and respect Treaties; but that if they should
unfortunately Clash, the Obligations of the Treaties will merit . . .
particular Attention."3
A charitable interpretation of this response would attribute to Justice Scott a
profound appreciation of judicial due process. The more likely explanation is
that he was content to leave the problem to be handled by a lower court judge.
so. The United States banned the slave trade in 1807, see supra, note 38, and Denmark banned
the slave trade in 1792. Edict of the King of Denmark and Norway, Concerning the Slave
Trade, Mar. 16, 1792, 1 B.S.P. 971.
51. Decree of the Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands, Relative to the Abolition of the Slave
Trade, June 15, 1814, 3 B.S.P. 889.
52. For example, a proposal from one W. Hutton urged the following:
Presuming on the local knowledge which I have of some Dutch and Danish
Settlements on the Coast of Africa ... I am emboldened to take the liberty, to
suggest the Capture of the said Settlements to your lordship; and which, I feel no
hesitation in saying, may be accomplished without the loss of a Man, and without
the smallest expence to the revenue, either in capturing the said Settlements, or
retaining them in our possession, after they are captured.
Letter from W. Hutton to the Earl of Bathurst, Sec'y of State for War & Colonies (Sept. 11,
1812) (on file with PRO, Colonial Office 267/35).
S3. Letter from William Scott, Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, to John Croker, First
Sec'y of the Admiralty (Aug. 5, 1812) (on file with PRO, Colonial Office 267/35).
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Indeed, Scott commented that Thorpe would have to "find his own way in the
construction and application of the Law, and if he happens to mistake it, his
mistakes must be corrected by the Court of Appeal to which he is subject, and
from whose decisions he is to draw his Instruction for his future Judicial
conduct." s4 On a more fundamental level, Scott's reply points to a unique
attribute of prize jurisdiction: the convergence of executive and judicial
authority."5 On one hand, this split personality could allow for tremendous
efficacy in enforcing international obligations. On the other, it could just as
easily allow for spectacular abuses, as will be discussed in Part III.
B. Thorpe's Theory of Prize Jurisdiction over Slave Ships
Left to his own devices in formulating a policy toward the adjudication of
captured slaving vessels brought into his court, Thorpe turned to three bodies
of law in order to cobble together a rationale that would support the
condemnation of these ships as lawful prize. The first was the law of Great
Britain; the second, treaty law; and the third, "justice, humanity, [and]
policy. '' s6 The resulting judicial policy was expansive in its grasp, rendering any
slave ship not explicitly protected by treaty with Britain open to capture by
British ships and condemnation by British courts. It put the Royal Navy and
the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone in the unique position of being the
enforcers of a near-universal ban on the slave trade.
In a letter to London on November 20, 1812, Thorpe reasoned that Great
Britain's 1807 Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade was an authoritative
declaration of the unlawfulness of the trade under the Law of Nations. Thorpe
claimed that because the Act recognized the fundamental injustice and
inhumanity of the slave trade, it compelled him to enforce the ban on the slave
trade not only against British ships, but also against the ships of any state not
explicitly authorized by treaty to trade in slaves. Because Portugal was the only
state to have signed such a treaty with Britain, slave ships from all other
nations were fair prize.17
54- Id.
5S. Prize courts were largely responsible for adjudicating legal questions of wartime rights and
dealing with the legal implications of executive decisions. From an institutional perspective,
prize courts led to a direct convergence of the executive and judiciary in that all prize cases
could be appealed to a subcommittee of the Privy Council, known as the Lords
Commissioners of Prize Appeal. See infra text accompanying note 1O9.
56. Letter from Robert Thorpe to the Earl of Bathurst, supra note 48.
57. Id.
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Thorpe's policy may seem bold, if not altogether revolutionary. But when
read in the context of British antislavery law, it was a logical continuation of
the judgment of Lord Mansfield in the 1772 case of Somerset v. Stewart."s That
judgment had the much-celebrated (and excoriated) effect of abolishing slavery
on English soil. However, the exact text of the judgment was more limited in
scope, holding only that slavery "is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to
support it, but positive law." 9 That is, in the absence of any positive law in
Britain permitting slavery, any slave brought onto English soil was to be
considered free. In the absence of such domestic laws, the British government
was not bound to execute the positive laws of any other jurisdiction (in the
Somerset case, Virginia) to enforce the master-slave relationship. The holding
did not rule out the possibility that slavery might someday be legislated into
existence in Britain, but it was received by British slaveholders and abolitionists
alike as dealing a deathblow to the institution in their country.60
There is a certain intellectual symmetry between the Somerset ruling and
the judicial policy articulated by Thorpe, for underlying both is the assumption
that the laws of nature prohibit slavery. 6' Only by mutual agreement through a
treaty - treaties being the positive law of nations - could states contract out of
the obligation not to participate in the slave trade. Thus, Francis Hargrave,
S8. (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.). An alternate spelling of the case name is Sommersett v.
Steuart. (1772) 20 Howell's State Trials 1, 79-82 (K.B.). Mark S. Weiner has recently
provided valuable biographical sketches of the parties to the case. See Mark S. Weiner, New
Biographical Evidence on Somerset's Case, 23 SLAVERY &ABOLITION 121(2002).
s5. 2o Howell's State Trials at 82. For an excellent discussion of the geographic limitations of
Somerset, see William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in
the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86, 105-18 (1974).
6o. For discussion of the reception of the case in the United Kingdom and the United States, see
COVER, supra note 2, at 87-99. Abolitionist Granville Sharp, often hailed as the "Father of
Sierra Leone," funded the case on Somerset's behalf. STEVEN M. WISE, THOUGH THE
HEAVENS MAY FALL: THE LANDMARK TRIAL THAT LED TO THE END OF HuMAN SLAVERY 123-
25, 217-18 (2005).
61. A variation on this idea persists to this day in the form of the jus cogens prohibition of
slavery. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines jus cogens as a
peremptory norm of international law, "a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation can be
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344. The distinction between the contemporary
approach to slavery and that of the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries is that there
can be no derogation-even by mutual consent-from a principle of jus cogens. See
BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 514-17.
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counsel for James Somerset, structured his client's case around natural law
sources, 6 arguing:
Slavery has been attended in different countries with circumstances so
various, as to render it difficult to give a general description of it. The
Roman lawyer... calls slavery, a constitution of the law of nations, by
which one is made subject to another contrary to nature. But this, as
has been often observed by the commentators, is mistaking the law, by
which slavery is constituted, for slavery itself, the cause for the effect;
though it must be confessed, that the latter part of the definition
obscurely hints at the nature of slavery.6"
The "Roman lawyer" to whom Hargrave referred is the Digest ofJustinian, the
legal text from which most early-modern writers on the law of nations derived
their conceptions of natural right.64 What is most striking about the passage
Hargrave cited is that the Digest emphatically asserts that slavery is contrary to
the law of nature.6" According to the Digest, slavery is instituted by the law of
nations, defined by Grotius as "the law which has received its obligatory force
from the will of all nations, or of many nations., 66 This tradition holds that
because the law of nations is based on custom and practice, its content is
mutable over time and distance; the law of nature, being universal and eternal,
is immutable. Consequently, slavery was not, as many Scholastic writers
asserted, consistent with nature,6z but was a positive state imposed from
without. 68 Turning to the writings of Bodin, Gentili, Pufendorf, Locke, and
62. See WISE, supra note 60, at 151-54.
63. 20 Howell's State Trials at 25.
64. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 94-101 (1999).
65. DIG. 1.5.4.1. (Florentinus, De Statu Hominum) (stating "Seruitus est constitutio iuris
gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subicitur," or "Slavery is an institution of
jus gentium, whereby one is subjected to the ownership of another contrary to nature"
(translation by the author)).
66. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES [OF THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, IN
THREE BOOKS] 44 (photo. reprint 1995) (Francis W. Kelsey trans., The Clarendon Press
1925) (1646).
67. See RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 65-67 (1999).
68. Hargrave argued:
Grotius describes slavery to be, an obligation to serve another for life, in
consideration of being supplied with the bare necessaries of life.... [But the
definition] by Grotius, and many other definitions which I have seen, if
understood strictly, will scarce suit any species of slavery, to which it is applied.
Besides, it omits one of slavery's severest and most usual incidents; the quality, by
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Huber, 6 ' Hargrave argued that the right to enslave peoples was historically
derived from the practice of states rather than from natural right, thereby
showing that this "most pernicious institution"7 could only find legitimacy in
the positive laws and practices of states.71
C. The Geographic Scope of the Court's Jurisdiction
With this juridical tradition as support, Thorpe laid out the parameters of
the West Africa Squadron's policy of coercive abolition. First, only nationals of
states that had passed statutes legalizing the slave trade-statutes whose
legitimacy Britain recognized through bilateral treaties with the states
themselves -could participate in the African slave trade. Second, any
Europeans found trading in slaves in an African territory not under the
dominion of their home state would be fair game for capture by the Royal
Navy or British privateers. The reasoning was that, in the absence of European
dominion over such territory, the laws of nature would proscribe slavery there
by default. It is notable that Thorpe did not entertain the possibility that some
of the territories in which the slave trade occurred were within the dominion of
indigenous peoples, and that their historical practices might therefore be a
legitimate source of title to slaves. Thorpe's silence on this point is telling
because conceding it would have laid bare a troubling fact: The slave trade was
undertaken by Europeans and Americans with the cooperation of local African
groups. Moreover, this concession would have undermined Britain's pretenses
of acting as the strong arm of the abolitionist cause, because such a concession
would have required an enormous exertion of military force on the continent of
Africa itself.
The reach of the Sierra Leone prize court would therefore extend as far as
the illicit European trade in slaves. According to Thorpe, this trade was indeed
widespread:
[I]n the Rio Pongus those Renegade Factors, who a few months since
renounced Slave trading, are still supplying those fast-sailing Ships and
Schooners that come under Spanish Colours & American Navigators &
which it involves all the issue in the misfortune of the parent. In truth, as I have
already hinted, the variety of forms, in which slavery appears, makes it almost
impossible to convey a just notion of it in the way of definition.
2o Howell's State Trials at 25 (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 27-34.
70. Id. at 26-27.
p. Id. at 33-67.
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who proceed with such alertness that this Cargo will be landed and the
Slaves put on board in Forty eight hours .... "
The geographical extent of the trade that Thorpe deemed illegal was vast,
comprising approximately 2500 kilometers of coastline. Thorpe fixed these
boundaries with the imperial constitution in mind. European powers, he
argued, could trade in slaves only on soil within their dominions (i.e., colonies)
and only when Britain had acknowledged the parent state's right to engage in
such trade by treaty. At the time Thorpe sat on the bench, the only West
African territory that could properly be called a European colony was Angola.
Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and Danish trading stations dotted the West
African coast, but none of these were colonies. As one historian has explained,
"in the period of the slave trade, Europeans did not appear in West Africa
north of the equator as invaders or masters, but as equal trading partners."73
Thorpe was determined to put an end to the illicit trade in slaves, whether
undertaken by equal trading partners or not. The prize court at Freetown was
to be the place of reckoning.
III. DEALING A DEATH BLOW TO THE EUROPEAN SLAVE TRADE
The task that Judge Thorpe undertook was Herculean: He sought to
enforce unilaterally a universal ban on the slave trade. Moreover, Thorpe
sought to do this without a clear mandate from his Government, relying
instead on a legal tradition favorable to his cause and on humanitarian
principles that he viewed as moral imperatives. This Part will show how
Thorpe's ideals fared when they encountered the harsh realities of life in Sierra
Leone: a self-interested merchant community, the need for cheap and
abundant labor, and a system of government-sponsored incentives for
abolitionism that yielded perverse results. This Part will culminate in an
analysis of the diplomatic and legal crisis that Thorpe's activities in Sierra
Leone precipitated back in Westminster, focusing on the historic case of Le
Louis and the genesis of the Courts of Mixed Commission.
72. Letter from Robert Thorpe to the Earl of Bathurst, supra note 48.
73. Christopher Fyfe, Freed Slave Colonies in West Africa, in 5 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
AFRICA 170, 170 (John E. Flint ed., 1976).
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A. British Abolitionism Becomes Lucrative
Following the British prohibition of the slave trade in 1807, Westminster
established powerful incentives for the enterprising British privateer to take up
the cause of abolitionism, regardless of the depth of his convictions. On May
16, 18o8, one year after the vice-admiralty court was established at Freetown,
the King issued an Order in Council offering a bounty for captured slaves of
£40 per man, £30 per woman, and £io per child, in lieu of prize money for the
ship itself.74 While the condemned slave ship and its fittings would become the
property of the British government, a generous bounty would be paid to the
captors for its human cargo. According to one historian, "[b]etween 1807 and
the middle of 1815 the Treasury paid naval captains [alone] £191,1oo in slave-
bounties.""
Between 1807 and 1811, 1991 slaves were released from captivity by
Thorpe's court;, 6 what became of them when they left the custody of their
captors depended greatly on the intentions of whatever colonial governor
happened to be in power at the time. Some governors were content to leave the
liberated slaves to fend for themselves. During the administration of Governor
William Maxwell (1811-1814), many recaptives' released at Freetown made
their way to the outskirts of the main settlement and established small
villages. 71 Others, however, found themselves "apprenticed" as quasi-slaves to
local farmers and merchants pursuant to the Act for the Abolition of the Slave
Trade.79 Neither the irony nor the injustice of this state of affairs was lost on
74. Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807, 47 Geo. 3, C. 36, art. VIII (U.K.).
75. FYFE, supra note 5, at 136.
76. Id. at 114.
7. "Recaptives" is the term frequently used in the literature to describe Africans who had
initially been captured for the slave trade, but who were subsequently "recaptured" by
abolitionists for liberation.
78. Id. at 119.
79. Article VII of the Act reserved to the Crown the right
to enter and enlist [recaptive Africans] ... into His Majesty's Land or Sea Service,
as Soldiers, Seamen or Marines, or to bind the same, or any of them, whether of
full Age or not, as Apprentices, for any Term, not exceeding fourteen Years, to
such Person or Persons ... as to His Majesty shall seem meet.
Under Article XVI, the Crown also reserved the right "to make such Orders and Regulations
for the future Disposal and Support of such Negroes as shall have been bound Apprentices
under this Act." In effect, the Act authorized the Crown and its officials to commit recaptives
to terms of forced labor subject to discretionary renewal. Act for the Abolition of the Slave
Trade, 1807,47 Geo. 3, C. 36, arts. VII, XVI (U.K.).
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Thorpe, who grew increasingly disenchanted with the ends to which
Freetown's political magnates were directing his judicial labors.80
The governors of Sierra Leone were not particularly renowned for the
depth of their humanitarian commitment., In fact, many were motivated more
by profit than compassion in their abolitionist efforts. Zachary Macaulay,
called "the great shopkeeper of the colony" by Thorpe, 2 appears to have
presided over a price-fixing racket of sorts at Freetown, even acting as agent for
the captors of slave ships in the vice-admiralty court at Freetown."3 As
mentioned above, condemned ships and their fittings became the property of
the Crown.84 They would most often be auctioned off at Freetown to the
highest bidders and re-registered as British ships.8s It appears that a circle of
the colony's most prominent merchants conspired together to depress the value
of bids so as to enable one another to purchase confiscated goods at below-
market prices for subsequent resale.86
go. As discussed in Part II, Thorpe's legal formulation for the condemnation of foreign slave
ships was carefully reasoned and closely followed available legal precedents. Furthermore,
Thorpe's correspondence indicates that his motives for condemning slave ships captured in
accordance with this formulation were pure. With his health failing in the harsh climate of
Sierra Leone, Thorpe wrote to the Earl of Bathurst: "Be assured My Lord could the forfeit of
my life be useful in emancipating Africa from the cruel bondage she has been so long
subjected I should not hesitate to sink on her burning sand ... "Letter from Robert Thorpe
to the Earl of Bathurst, supra note 48. Thorpe expressed a similar sentiment in his letter to
Liverpool of February, 1812. Letter from Robert Thorpe to Lord Liverpool, supra note 33.
81. A contemporary joke was that "there were always two governors of Sierra Leone- the one
who had just arrived, and the one who had just returned." LLOYD, supra note 4, at 15. In 1811
alone the colony had three governors, each of whom saw fit to approach the question of
what to do with the recaptives according to his own lights. They were Captain Edward
Columbine, Lieutenant Robert Bones, and Lieutenant-Colonel William Maxwell.
SIBTHORPE, supra note 5, at 25.
8z. THORPE, supra note 26, at 29. Macaulay was governor of Sierra Leone in 1796 while it was
still under the control of the Sierra Leone Company. See SIBTHORPE, supra note 5, at 225. He
remained a prominent businessman in the colony long after his governorship. FYFE, supra
note S, at 122-23, 166-67.
83. This allegation is made persuasively in the Memorial of William Henry Gould Page to HRH
the Prince Regent in Council (June 24, 1815) (on file with PRO, Foreign Office 72/182/72-73)
[hereinafter Memorial of William Henry Gould Page], and is supported by the corrupt
business practices described by Thorpe in his Letter to Wilberforce, which suggested that the
capture and liquidation of ships was favored at the expense of the development of the local
economy. THORPE, supra note 26, at 28-35
84. See supra text accompanying note 75.
85. Act of May 27, 1814, 54 Geo. 3, c. 59 (U.K.) (permitting ships that had been taken and
condemned due to their use in the slave trade to be registered as British-built ships).
86. Memorial of William Henry Gould Page, supra note 83.
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Meeting the demand for low-cost merchandise required a steady supply of
captured ships, which the more unscrupulous of Sierra Leone's colonial
governors were happy to procure. Governor Maxwell, for example,
aggressively deployed ships to despoil slave factories in the estuaries of the
Sierra Leone River. s7 An 1815 memorial addressed to the Privy Council on
behalf of a group of Havana-based Spanish ship owners spoke of one stunning
foray:
[T]he late Governor William Maxwell Esquire thought fit to dispatch
an armed expedition against the Settlement of Cape Mesurado (distant
upwards of two hundred miles from Sierra Leone) which seized at that
place Property to a large amount, in Ships merchandize and Slaves, this
being taken to Sierra Leone was there condemned, as like matter of
course . . . and the Owners of the Factories sent to Sierra Leone,
imprisoned and sentenced by this all-condemning Tribunal to fourteen
years transportation [in New South Wales].S8
Aggressive interceptions of slave ships by both the Royal Navy and
privateers became the norm along the West African coast. Sometimes these
interceptions occurred indiscriminately. The same memorial speaks of an
expedition deployed by Governor Maxwell to distant Spanish settlements
along the Rio Nufiez and Rio Pongo for the purpose of despoiling the slave
factories there. The expedition returned to Sierra Leone with three Spanish
ships, their human and chattel cargo, and ivory, cotton, and other merchandise
valued at over £1o,ooo. In addition, the expedition arrested three white men,
including one Spaniard and one American. 9
The men were tried at Sierra Leone in April of 1814, while Thorpe was
visiting London in order to air his grievances over the governance of the
colony.9 ° Governor Maxwell had appointed a friend of his, Dr. Robert Purdie,
87. A handwritten roster kept by an administrative official at Sierra Leone provides the names of
over 15oo captive Africans who were released into the colony in 1812 alone, approximately
three-quarters of the total number released at the Freetown during the previous four years
combined. See Disposal of Captured Negroes Received in the Colony of Sierra Leone During
the Year 1812 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with PRO, Colonial Office 267/35).
88. Memorial of William Henry Gould Page, supra note 83.
89. Id. The document is silent as to the nationality of the third prisoner.
go. His most impassioned plea for reform came in the form of his Letter to Wilberforce. Thorpe
wrote:
[H]ere is involuntary servitude for life, established by an Act of Parliament,
purporting to abolish slavery. . . [A]nd the seat of this new slavery is in
Freetown, in the colony founded by the most benevolent men, on the most liberal
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the Colonial Surgeon, to act as Chief Judge in Thorpe's stead.91 The three
accused remained in prison for seven months before being sent to Portsmouth,
England, where they were supposed to board a ship for the penal colony at
Botany Bay, Australia. Luckily for the convicts, they arrived at Portsmouth just
after the ship bound for Botany Bay had departed. Through an agent, they
appealed their sentences to the Prince Regent 92 in Council (i.e., the Privy
Council), who released them from the sentence imposed by the court in Sierra
Leone. 93 The Council gave no further explanation for its decision. However,
because the appellants do not appear to have sought compensation for their
financial losses, it is quite likely that the Council did not see any use in
detaining them further. In fact, prolonging their detention would have only
been likely to incur the anger of diplomatic officials from Spain and the United
States.
Besides, by then the Privy Council had bigger problems brewing.
B. Toward a Diplomatic Crisis
Once legally consecrated by Thorpe, the vigor with which British ships
captured foreign slavers triggered a diplomatic crisis between Spain and
Britain. Under Thorpe's legal formulation, any West African territory or
waterway not within the dominion of a power authorized by treaty to carry on
the slave trade was fair game for incursion by British naval vessels and
privateers. This included the Rio Nufiez and Rio Pongo, along which Spanish
slavers were particularly active. As British incursions into these areas increased
in number and intensity, Spanish merchants and the Spanish government alike
plan: exalted as the freest spot on earth, to enlighten benighted Africa; and
displayed to the world as the finest example of British liberty, and British
philanthropy!!!
Thus the abolition Act is to give us slaves without purchase, by seizing them
from our allies; and then the framers of this magical act (which is to free and
enslave at the same moment), acknowledge, that they look forward to its
removing many objections to our purchasing Africans, for the same avowed and
specific purpose ourselves!
THORPE, supra note 26, at 46-47.
91. FYFE, supra note 5, at 120-21.
9z. George III was, by this time, incapacitated by mental illness. Prince George served as Regent
in his stead.
93. Memorial of William Henry Gould Page, supra note 83.
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began pressuring Westminster to intervene on their behalf. This pressure
would force the British government to rethink the degree of judicial discretion
it would allow Thorpe to exercise.
In January 1813, the Spanish Ship Juan set sail from Havana, Cuba for the
western coast of Africa, bearing a cargo of dry goods. Her Havana-based
owner, Don Luis Martinez, did not hear of her for eleven months. Finally, in
November of 1813, one Bartholomew Maria Maestre returned to Havana from
the Rio Pongo bearing news of the ship. On May 27, 1813, the deposition of the
Juan's captain stated that the ship had been
captured by an armed vessel under English Colours and carried into the
port of Sierra Leone but [Maestre] did not know the name of the vessel
which had made the said Capture, nor whether any proceedings had
been instituted against the said Ship Juan in the Vice Admiralty Court
of that Settlement... [.]94
Archival documentation of this period from the Foreign Office indicates that
Don Martinez's predicament was not unusual. In fact, the Juan was but one of
over two hundred Spanish ships captured and condemned as prize at
Freetown. 9'
When the captive ships arrived at Freetown, their captains and masters
were detained by British authorities. Unable to correspond with the ships'
respective owners (or with anyone else, for that matter), they were left to
languish in Freetown prisons until either released or condemned to
transportation. Consequently, ship owners and investors might spend months
waiting for any news of the fate of their vessels. 6 Such was the case of the
Juan, whose master, Juan Jose Patrollo, was detained for almost a year before
returning to Havana in July of 1814.
9 7
When the owner of the Juan learned that his ship had been captured, he
immediately filed a protest with Spanish government officials in Cuba, as did
scores of other merchants and ship owners in Havana, the main hub of the
Spanish slave trade to the New World.98 In the vast majority of cases, the ship
owners could not pursue formal appeals to the Lords Commissioners in
London because their window of opportunity had closed. While some may
94. Deposition of Juan Jose Patrollo, In re The Juan (June 24, 1815) (Ct. Prize App.)
(handwritten court clerk's manuscript, on file with PRO, Foreign Office 72/182/78-79).
9s. Memorial of William Henry Gould Page, supra note 83.
96 Id.
97. Deposition of Juan Jose Patrollo, supra note 94.
98. LLOYD, supra note 4, at 26-27.
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never have had sufficient documentation to bring the claim in any event, others
may have learned that their ships had been captured long after the expiration of
the statutory period in which an appeal could be filed.99
Because Spanish government officials could provide little relief to the
Cuban merchants, the Governor of Havana authorized a meeting of the
planters, merchants, and ship owners of the city "to consider of the proper
measures to be taken to procure compensation for the ruinous losses to which
they [had] thus been subjected."' With the Governor's blessing, they
resolved to employ an agent in London, William Page, to represent their claims
before the Privy Council. Privy Councilors could negotiate directly with foreign
governments for the release of ships, just as they could interpret treaties on a
case-by-case basis, thus keeping the power to shape foreign relations at least
nominally within the grasp of the King-in-Parliament.0 1
Page presented a litany of complaints to the Council. Not only did he
enumerate cases involving the seizure of ships and the indefinite detention of
their captains, he attached to one memorial ten long pages of affidavits
attesting to the destruction of factories along the Rio Pongo by British ships,
which carried the slaves back to Freetown to cash in for bounty.'0 2
Westminster could no longer turn a blind eye to events in Sierra Leone. On
October 31, 1815, Christopher Robinson, a judge in the High Court of
Admiralty and member of Doctors' Commons," 3 issued an advisory letter to
99. As Page's Memorial notes:
[T]he impossibility which the Captains experienced (being Strangers and
surrounded by Enemies) of giving the requisite Security to obtain copies of the
Proceedings, the period for entering Appeals, according to the Prize Act (namely
twelve months and a day) elapsed in many cases, before the owners could even
learn the fate of their ships ....
Memorial of William Henry Gould Page, supra note 83.
100. Id.
lol. At some point in time the Lords Commissioners began to see themselves not as an ad hoc
committee of the Privy Council, but as judicial officers presiding over an independent court
of law. Historians have yet to determine precisely when or why this change occurred. For a
general discussion of these issues, see PARES, supra note 7, at 1O2-O8.
io. Memorial of William Henry Gould Page, supra note 83; see also Deposition of Juan Jose'
Patrollo, supra note 94.
103. Doctors' Commons, so called for the doctors of law who were its members, was the
equivalent of an inn of court for the civil lawyers of England. It was a professional
association as well as a social one, and its most distinguished members frequendy advised
admiralty judges and lawyers on the resolution of cases and points of law. See G.D. SQ.UIBB,
DocroRS' COMMONS: A HISTORY OF THE COLLEGE OF ADVOCATES AND DoCToRS OF LAW
(1977). Christopher Robinson soon would become the Chief Judge of the High Court of
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the Foreign Secretary that would bring an abrupt end to Thorpe's expansive
interpretation of the British right to capture slave ships. Robinson wrote:
"There has never been any Principle avowed by any Court of Justice in England
by which Cruizers can have been envisaged to venture on the Seizure and
detention of Vessels, being bona fide Spanish property, engaged in the Slave
Trade .... ,1o4 This advice doubtlessly would have been of inestimable value to
Thorpe when he sought counsel from Lord Liverpool in 1812.105 However, it is
possible that at that time the British government was emboldened by Spain
and Portugal's dependence on British military might to expel Napoleon's forces
from the Iberian Peninsula, and therefore was willing to allow abolitionist
measures in Africa that were more audacious than it would have under normal
circumstances.
The letter effected a radical change in official policy back in London, and
Thorpe was forced to comply with the legal analysis of his superior, Judge
Robinson. These events shook the foundations of the abolitionist project over
which Thorpe had set out to preside from the bench. Two years after Page
presented his memorial on behalf of the Havana merchants, and after two
additional years of discussion between the two governments, Spain and the
United Kingdom concluded a treaty under which Spain agreed that the
Spanish slave trade would be illegal as of May 30, 1820. ,6 In return for this
concession, the British Treasury paid £400,ooo to the Spanish government as
compensation for injuries committed against her nationals by the West Africa
Squadron and British privateers. A similar compensation package in the
amount of £300,000 had been paid to the Portuguese government when,
under the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of January 22, 1815, the Portuguese agreed
not to engage in the African slave trade north of the Equator. 10 7 (No such
compensation was offered to the Dutch, who had already agreed to ban the
slave trade under an Anglo-Dutch treaty in 1814. °8)
Admiralty. See JOSEPH HAYDN, THE BOOK OF DIGNITIES 423 (photo. reprint 1970) (3d ed.,
London, W.H. Allen & Co. 1894).
104. Letter from Christopher Robinson, Admiralty Judge, to Viscount Castlereagh, Sec'y of State
for Foreign Affairs (Oct. 31, 1815) (on file with PRO, Foreign Office 38/2364/313).
1os. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
1o6. Treaty for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, Spain-U.K., Sept. 23, 1817, 4 B.S.P. 33, available
at http://www.pdavis.nl/Treaty-1817 .htm.
107. Treaty on the Gradual Abolition of the Slave Trade, Port.-U.K., Jan. 22, 1815, 3 B.S.P. 937,
available at http://www.pdavis.nl/Treaty-Portugal.htm. For a more detailed discussion of
these compensation packages, see Convention on Payment for Ships, Port.-U.K., Jan. 21,
1815, 3 B.S.P. 936; and FyrE, supra note 5, at 136-38.
1o8. Convention Between Great Britain and the Netherlands Relative to the Dutch Colonies;
Trade with the East and West Indies; &c., Neth.-U.K., Aug. 13, 1814, 2 B.S.P. 370.
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C. Le Louis in Context
It is in the context of this recalibration of British abolitionist policy that we
can best understand one of the most celebrated cases heard in the Prize Court
of Appeals,"0 9 the case of Le Louis, which affirmed the principle of free
navigation in time of peace. However, it also articulated a sobering principle
that warns those contemplating humanitarian intervention that "a nation is not
justified in assuming rights that do not belong to her merely because she
means to apply them to a laudable purpose; nor in setting out upon a moral
crusade of converting other nations by acts of unlawful force."110
While diplomatic and executive channels were fully engaged in resolving
the Spanish and Portuguese claims, a public debate was raging over the
likelihood of a revived French slave trade. The 1814 Treaty of Paris, which
brought the Napoleonic Wars to a short-lived end, allowed France to keep the
territories she had acquired in Senegal. This, combined with the 18ol revival of
slavery by Napoleon, led to fears that France would become a great slaving
power in West Africa. Therefore, Britain insisted on an additional protocol to
the Treaty of Paris under which France agreed to end its slave trade within five
years." At the time of the Treaty's conclusion, one British writer lamented the
apparent hypocrisy of British policy toward France:
She has instituted courts for the purpose of confiscating slave ships,...
she has condemned to the pains and penalties of felony every British
subject... who shall be concerned in buying or selling slaves either in
Asia or Africa... she has been employing her naval and military forces
in destroying the very last strongholds of the slave trade... and [she]
has branded and punished as felons of a high order the miscreants who
had stained the British name by continuing to carry it on. And while
she has done all this .. she coolly stipulates for the admission of the
1o9. The Prize Court of Appeals was a subcommittee of the Privy Council. It was the court of
final appeal within the system of admiralty jurisdiction. Counting among their ranks some
of the key architects of state policy, the Lords Commissioners were in a unique position to
develop legal doctrines against the backdrop of diplomatic and military exigencies because,
within the Council, judge and statesman were one and the same. For a discussion of this
body in the nineteenth century, see ROSCOE, supra note 7, at 74-75.
lio. Le Louis, (1817) 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 148o (High Ct. of Adm.).
mi. Additional Articles, Treaty of Paris, Fr.-U.K., May 30, 1814, 1 B.S.P. 151, 172-73.
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whole body of the French people to the full and free exercise of this
criminal traffic... .2
No matter how profound or sincere the convictions that may have motivated
Britain's experiment in humanitarian intervention on the western coast of
Africa, passion alone could not sustain it.
By 1815, the eight-year-long experiment was beginning to wind down,
straining under the weight of French, Portuguese, and Spanish protests. The
1817 case of Le Louis,"3 adjudicated on appeal in the High Court of Admiralty,
brought the experiment to its jurisprudential end. In 1816, the Queen Charlotte,
a British ship, captured the French slave ship Le Louis near Cape Mesurado and
brought her to the prize court at Freetown for adjudication. The ship was
condemned by the court, but her owners appealed the decision to London.
Judge William Scott decided the appeal with a degree of clarity and precision
conspicuously absent from his advice to Thorpe on the matter five years
before."
4
Judge Scott's ruling cut to the heart of the legal assumptions underpinning
Britain's policy of intercepting and condemning slave ships. It held that, all
states being sovereign and equal, all states have an equal right to the free
navigation of the high seas. With the exception of the rights of war that permit
belligerents to search neutral ships during wartime,"' no state could claim the
right to interrupt foreign navigation. Scott therefore issued the following
admonition to Britain: So long as your own security is not jeopardized by the
slave trade, "you have no right to prevent a suspected injustice towards another
by committing an actual injustice of your own. ", 6 He thus dealt a deathblow to
Thorpe's efforts to impose a unilateral international ban on the West African
slave trade.
The ruling in Le Louis undermined any legal claim that Britain could make
for the enforcement of her ban on the slave trade against the nationals of other
states. Notwithstanding this ruling, by 1817 British naval ships and privateers
112. OBSERVATIONS ON THAT PART OF THE LATE TREATY WITH FRANCE WHICH RELATES TO THE
AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 8 (London, Ellerton & Henderson 1814). For similar lines of
argument, see THE SPEECH OF SIR SAMUEL ROMILLY, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, ON THE
TWENTY-EIGHTH JUNE, 1814, ON THAT ARTICLE IN THE TREATY OF PEACE WHICH RELATES TO
THE SLAVE TRADE 14-16 (London, J. M'Creery 1814).
113. Le Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
115. See, e.g., O.H. Mootham, The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage, 1756-1815, 8 BgrT. Y.B. INT'L L.
62, 63-67 (1927).
116. Le Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. at 1479.
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along the West African coast-supported by the Court of Vice Admiralty at
Sierre Leone -had set in motion the ultimate demise of the European trade in
African slaves. The pressure exerted by the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra
Leone helped bring the major slaving states of Europe to the negotiating table
with Britain, by then the world's mightiest sea power. Diplomatic channels
secured the agreement of those states to withdraw from traffic in human
beings over the course of the coming years.
Moreover, by no means did the decision in Le Louis mark the end of
abolition through interception. Instead, it heralded the beginning of a
multilateral effort on the part of Britain, France, Portugal, and Spain to enforce
their respective bans (or, in the case of Portugal, restraints) on the West
African slave trade through the Mixed Prize Commissions. From 1819 to 1871,
these mixed commissions, constituted by treaty for the suppression of the slave
trade, sat at Freetown, Havana, New York, and major ports in Africa and Latin
America. The bilateral treaties between the United Kingdom and Spain, 117
Portugal,11 and the Netherlands," 9 respectively, stipulated that nationals of
each state party to the treaty would preside over the judicial proceedings. The
commissions had no jurisdiction over the captain or crew of ships -only over
the ships themselves and their cargo. Captain and crew would be turned over
to the authorities of the states of which they were nationals. The decisions of
the commissions would be final: No appeal would be allowed. Hence, the
commissions were founded on and administered through the cooperative
efforts of all of the states whose nationals were involved in the slave trade. 120
Thus, the bold unilateralism of the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone
yielded to the conciliatory multilateralism of the negotiating tables of Europe
and, ultimately, to the deliberations of mixed commissions the world over.
Although Thorpe's judicial experiment ended in 1815, he remained committed
to the cause of abolitionism. Consistent in his principles, if not in the manner
he considered fit to implement them, Thorpe returned to England in order to
urge the British government to continue its campaign to end the slave trade
through diplomatic channels. In this manner, the vision of one judge
influenced the policies of a state, and, in turn, the policies of that state spread
to many, thereby setting in motion Europe's abolition of the slave trade.
117. Treaty for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, Spain-U.K., supra note io6.
118. Treaty on the Gradual Abolition of the Slave Trade, Port.-U.K., supra note 107.
ig. Treaty for Preventing Any Traffic in Slaves, Neth.-U.K., May 4, 1818, 5 B.S.P. 125, available
at http://www.pdavis.nl/TreatyNL.htm.
12o. For a thorough account of the structure and workings of the mixed commissions, see Leslie
Bethell, The Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the
Nineteenth Century, 7 J. AFR. HIST. 79, 79-89 (1966).
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IV. THE TRADE IN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:
SOME LEGAL PARALLELS
Although two centuries old, the lessons to be gleaned from the work of
Chief Judge Thorpe at the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone are relevant
to contemporary problems in international law. The basic problem Thorpe
faced was how to stop a trade in human chattel, notwithstanding the fact that it
was protected in some cases by treaty and in others by principles of free
navigation. How could a British naval vessel lawfully intercept a slave ship on
the high seas and then bring it to a British court for condemnation as prize (1)
in time of peace, and (2) when certain traders possessed a positive right to
engage in the slave trade by treaty with England? To this question, Thorpe
urged the following answer: Treat slave traders as hostes humani generis -the
equivalent of pirates under international law-and leave them open to the same
sort of treatment one would give such enemies of humankind. Slave ships
could thus be intercepted and captured in any place and by any state." '
However, because other states did not agree that slave traders were hostes
humani generis, Thorpe soon recognized the contradiction inherent in his
attempt to enforce unilaterally against states a norm that only he and a
community of abolitionists conceived of as universal.
There is a similar paradox inherent in the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) today." Announced by President George W. Bush in 2003, the PSI is a
multilateral attempt to curb the international trade in weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their components through the interdiction of ships
carrying on such trade. 23 The existing legal regime governing the high seas
would seem to militate against the interdictions and confiscations under the
PSI. Article lio of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
121. THORPE, supra note 26, at 64.
122. For overviews of the PSI and the challenges it poses to existing norms of international law,
see Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the
Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131 (2005); and Daniel H. Joyner, The
Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation, and International Law, 30
YALE J. INT'L L. 507 (2005).
123. See Bureau of Int'l Sec. & Nonproliferation, U.S. Dep't of State, Proliferation Security
Initiative, http://www.state.gov//isVclo39o.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 20o6). The
announcement named sixteen participating states. There are presently fifteen confirmed
participating states in the PSI, while an additional sixty states have agreed to cooperate with
the eleven core PSI states. For an explanation of how another historic precedent may help
untangle some of the knotty problems arising from the PSI, see Tara Helfman, Neutrality,
the Law of Nations, and the Natural Law Tradition: A Study of the Seven Years' War, 30 YALE J.
INT'L L. 549, 58 5- 8 6 (2005).
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guarantees ships complete immunity from interference on the high seas unless
there is a reasonable basis upon which to suspect that the ship is engaged in,
inter alia, piracy or the slave trade.' 4 Yet nowhere does Article 11o allow for
interference in the transport of noncontraband weapons, rendering it difficult
for states to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists or rogue
governments. Hence the question arises, on what legal grounds can states
forcibly interdict ships suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction in
order to prevent deadly goods from falling into the hands of dangerous people?
Although it took shape in negotiating rooms through a distinctly
multilateral effort, the PSI has its origins in an episode that posed a direct legal
challenge (much like those represented by Thorpe's prize cases) to the legal
regime governing free navigation: the So-San incident. In December 2002,
Spanish ships, working in conjunction with U.S. intelligence agencies,
interdicted the So-San, a North Korean ship bound for Yemen. Buried under
tons of bags of concrete, the interdicting forces found fifteen Scud missiles
along with WMD components. In the absence of any treaties to the contrary,
the trade in WMD is the formal equivalent of trade in any licit good.
Consequently, the U.S. government was forced to permit the vessel and its
cargo to complete its voyage.
12
Since the PSI was announced, the United States and other PSI countries
have done what Britain and the slave trading powers of Europe did in Thorpe's
wake: hasten to the negotiating table. Under the leadership of the United
States, sixteen states have committed to participating in the PSI as of January
2005. An undisclosed number of interdictions have taken place through their
cooperation. In addition, the United States has begun concluding bilateral
interdiction treaties with the world's leading ship-registry states.126 The first of
these treaties was concluded with Liberia in February 2004. Under the terms of
these treaties, each state recognizes the right of the other to interdict ships
sailing under its flag on the high seas if they are suspected of transporting
WMD. The right "can normally be exercised only if a request for authorization
is first made to the flag state. But the treaty also stipulates that authorization
may be presumed, if such a request is made and two hours pass without a
124. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 1o, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
125. David E. Sanger & Thorn Shanker, Reluctant U.S. Gives Assent for Missiles To Go to Yemen,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2002, at Ai.
126. SHARON SQUASSONI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT No. RS2188i, PROLIFERATION
SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 3-6 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/
RS21881.pdf.
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response." 27 The treaty serves as a model to be replicated by other states and
has been put to such use. The United States has concluded five further
boarding agreements and is reportedly in negotiations with two dozen other
states.12 8 However, none of these treaties stipulate what is to be done with
WMD found on board, nor is the interdicting state authorized to confiscate
them. 129
The international community is only beginning to deal with the challenges
to international security posed by a free trade in WMD. However, if the defiant
and ultimately successful challenge that Robert Thorpe made to the slave trade
is any indication of the course we ought to take, the possibility for constraint of
this new deadly trade is promising. 30
CONCLUSION
While Robert Thorpe quickly learned that he could not single-handedly
enforce a universal ban on the slave trade from his humble bench at Freetown,
he could and did help set into motion the political and diplomatic engines of
change. By applying an expansive interpretation to prevailing treaty regimes
and by drawing upon the traditions of natural law and liberty as received by
British courts, Thorpe provided judicial consecration for the abolitionist spirit
upon which the Sierra Leone Colony was founded. And when the colony's
leading members began to subvert this spirit, Thorpe made himself the
champion of Sierra Leone's recaptives and the scourge of Freetown's magnates.
127. Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT'L L.
526, 530 (2004).
128. The United States has since concluded similar treaties with the Marshall Islands and
Panama. SQUASSONI, supra note 126, at 3.
129. Bureau of Int'l Sec. & Nonproliferation, U.S. Dep't of State, Ship Boarding Agreements,
http://www.state.gov/t/isrVc12386.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006) (listing agreements with
Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, and Panama).
13o. The development of the legal regime governing the continental shelf also follows this
pattern. In 1945, President Truman issued a proclamation stating: "[T]he United States
regards the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United
States, subject to its jurisdiction and control." Proclamation No. 2667, 1O Fed. Reg. 12,303
(Oct. 2, 1945). This claim of sovereignty was the first of its kind, and immediately prompted
other states to make similar claims. This process ultimately led the Law of the Sea
Conference to adopt the Continental Shelf Convention in 1958. For accounts of the genesis
of the Convention, see R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LowE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 142-45 (3d ed.
1999); ROBERT L. FRIEDHEIM, NEGOTIATING THE NEW OCEAN REGIME 20-26 (1993); and
J.R.V. PREscoTr, THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE OCEANS 144-47 (1975).
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Through his judicial decisions, he sought to bring an end to the odious
commerce undertaken by Western Europe's slaving powers; through his letters
and his pamphlets, he laid bare the hypocrisy of Freetown's leaders.
Cumulatively, Thorpe's efforts forced Britain to the point of diplomatic
crisis. If Westminster was to quiet the clamor of the Spanish, Portuguese,
Dutch, and Danes, it would have to replace its policy of benign neglect toward
Sierra Leone with vigorous diplomacy. Thorpe's judicial experiment at
Freetown thus brought the slave-trading powers of Europe to the negotiating
table with Britain. The Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone served as a
model for the Mixed Prize Commissions: international tribunals constituted by
treaty for the adjudication and condemnation of ships involved in the slave
trade. Thus did the unilateral claim asserted by one state (i.e., that the slave
trade is unlawful) spread to a group of states, and subsequently enter into the
body of general norms of international law. For what Thorpe could not bring
to a grinding halt, he instead brought to a gradual end. This is a dynamic that
is beginning to unfold in the case of the PSI today. Whether this multilateral
effort will help to control the international traffic in WMD, however, remains
to be seen.
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